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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
been said that equity has its law as law has its equity. This
is another way of saying that equitable remedies are administered in accordance with rules as certain as human
wisdom can devise, leaving their application to the discretion of the chancellor in doubtful cases only. Even in
those cases the chancellor is charged with the duty of
balancing rights rather than permitted to grant favors "of
grace' '.27
Thus, the lawyer when confronted with a case of this
kind must examine the facts surrounding the defendant's
case with the same care as he examines those of his own client. Otherwise, how can he tell whether the delay of the
plaintiff, if any there be, has existed sufficiently long to have
allowed the defendant to have been placed at a disadvantage by reason of a change of position or condition?
Frank H. Strouss.
Former Judge of Northumberland County.

LIABILITY OF THEATER OWNERS FOR INJURIES
TO PATRONS ON THE PREMISES
(PENNSYLVANIA CASES)

It is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania judiciary
did not enunciate the rule concerning liability of theater
owners for injuries sustained by patrons until 1926. Three
years prior to that time, the Superior Court, in the case of
Leckstein vs. Morris, 80 Pa. Super. 352, was confronted
with a case involving the liability of theater owners, but
the Court did not avail itself of the opportunity to expound
the applicable principles.
From the plaintiff's testimony in that case, it appeared
that she and her grandchild attended the defendant's
theater. Since the child had occasion to use the toilet, the
plaintiff made an inquiry of an attendant, who directed her
to the public lavatory in the basement. The steps were
27Sullivan v, Steel Co. 208 Pa. 540 at 554.
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very dimly lighted. One of the steps was defective, and
when the plaintiff, who was descending carefully, tramped
on it, she was thrown to the bottom of the steps and was
injured. The break on the step appeared to be an old one
and had been seen by a witness six days before the accident, "so that sufficient time had elapsed for the defendant
to have constructive notice of its defective condition."
This evidence was contradicted flatly by the defendant, and the trial court submitted the case to the jury,
which returned a verdict for the plaintiff, judgment being
entered on the verdict. The defendant appealed to the
Superior Court, which merely held that the case was one
properly for the jury, and did not discuss the pertinent legal
phases of the case.
Three years later, both the Superior and Supreme
Courts were confronted with controversies in which the
liability of a theater owner was at issue. In both of these
cases, the Courts announced and applied the general rules
relating to such accidents.
In Rutherford vs. Academy of Music, 87 Pa. Super.
355, the facts were as follows:
The plaintiff purchased a ticket for a moving picture
entertainment, entered the theater, and walked upstairs to
the third floor, with which part of the building she was not
familiar. When she reached the third floor, she handed
her ticket to one of the ushers. The latter took the ticket
and told the plaintiff to "go around the corridor to No. H."
The corridor was dark, but it was "light enough to advance
in." As the plaintiff was passing carefully through the
curved corridor as directed, she noticed Section G, but before she reached Section H she fell down a short flight of
stairs which she said she could not see, and sprained her
ankle.
Thee case was submitted to the jury and a verdict was
returned in favor of the plaintiff. The Court, however, on
motion of the defendant, entered judgment for the defendant n. o. v. The plaintiff appealed, and the Superior Court
reversed the judgment, directing that judgment be entered
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on the verdict. The Court, in its opinion, set forth the
applicable principle in the following language:
"While we have found no decision of the Supreme
Court or this Court which is directly in point, it has
been held by many of our sister states that a proprietor
of a theater conducted for reward or profit, to which
the general public are invited to attend performances,
must use ordinary care to make the premises as reasonably safe as is consistent with the practical operation
of the theater, and if he fails in this duty he may be
held liable for personal injuries occasioned thereby."
It was held that "the question whether defendant was
negligent in failing to provide sufficient light for patrons
using ordinary care to see the steps * * * * was for the

jury."
In the same year, the Supreme Court elaborated upon
this principle in the case of Durning vs. Hyman, 286 Pa.
376, the facts of which will be detailed in a subsequent
portion of this note. The opinion, written by the late
Justice Sadler with his usual thoroughness, is so replete
with interesting and supporting authorities that the portion
relevant here is quoted liberally:
"* **

* The liability of the theater owner to one

attending a performance has not been the subject ok
discussion in our appellate courts, though discussions
are to be found sustaining recoveries where affirmative
proof of negligence was offered by the plaintiff: Leckstein v. Morris, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 354; Rutherford
v. Academy of Music, 3 Adv. (Unof. Ser.) Superior Ct.
320. In other jurisdictions, the question now expressly
presented has been considered, and the applicable rules
applied. The proprietor, though not an insurer of
safety, impliedly contracts that, except for unknown
defects, not discoverable by reasonable means, the
(appliance which proved to be defective) is safe':
Scott v. Athletic Assn., 152 Mich. 684, 116 N. W. 624;
Logan v. Agricultural Society, 156 Mich. 537, 121 N.
W. 485; Redmond v. National Horse Show Assn., 138
N. Y. Supp. 364; Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp.
Co., 174 N. Y. 310, 66 N. E. 968. 'The owner of a
place of entertainment is charged with an affirmative
positive obligation to know that the premises are safe
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for the public use. He may not be exonerated merely
because he had no precise knowledge of the defective
condition of the place to which he has invited the
public. When they accept his invitation and pay the
prescribed admission fee, they have a right to assume
he has furnished a safe place for them to witness the
performance': Lusk v. Peck, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1051.
1054."
LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF SERVANTS AND AGENTS

In many of our cases, the decisions involved the question of the owner's responsibility for the actions of his servants, such as ticket takers, ushers, etc. The usual rules of
master and servant are applicable in these situations, but
the defendants often have attempted to escape liability on
the ground that their employees have not acted within the
course of their employment. A review of these cases presents some very interesting factual situations.
In James vs. Smith, 93 Pa. Super. 485, it appeared
that the plaintiff, on entering the defendant's theater, asked
the employee who took his ticket to be directed to a toilet
room. Following the directions given, the plaintiff went
to a door, opened it, took one step across the threshold, and
was precipitated into the cellar, thereby sustaining injuries.
The trial court submitted the case to the jury, who returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant took an
appeal, contending, inter alia, that the ticket taker, even
though he had authority to give directions to arriving spectators with reference to seats in the theater, was not acting
within the course of his employment in directing a patron
to a toilet room. The Court concluded that the question of
whether or not the ticket taker was acting within his province was a question for the jury and was properly submitted to it.
A peculiar and unusual set of facts is found in the case
of Rice vs. Gibson, 94 Pa. Super. 541. During the course
of the performance, a disturbance occurred in the second
or top gallery, which resulted in an unknown patron being
thown over the railing and down upon the plaintiff, who
occupied a seat on the first floor. Two of the defendant's
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employees, one of whom was a special officer whose duty
it was to keep order in the theater, had approached the
unknown patron in the gallery for the purpose of ejecting
him. A disturbance developed and a fight resulted. During the fistic combat, the employee struck the unknown
and knocked him over the banister. The victim fell upon
the plaintiff, who, as before stated, was occupying a seat
on the first floor.
The trial court submitted the case to the jury, which
returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant's later
motion for judgment n. o. v. was dismissed. Upon appeal
to the Superior Court, the defendant contended that the
acts of his employees were outside the course of their employment, since they had neither the actual nor the apparent outhority to indulge in their belligerent conduct. This
contention was not received very favorably by the Superior Court, whose opinion reiterated the
"* * * * familiar doctrine that not every deviation
of the servant from the strict execution of his duty
will relieve the master of responsibility for his acts
done during such deviation. If defendant's servants
committed wrongful acts in the performance of the
duties required of them, it was for the jury to say
whether these acts were done in the-course of their
employment and within the scope of their duty: Luckett vs. Reighard, 248 Pa. 24: Marcus vs. Gimbel Bros.,
231 Pa. 200; Blaker vs. Philadelphia Electric Co., 60
Pa. Super. 56."

-Another case in which the problem of agency or "servantcy" was present is that of Glaverson vs. Barowsky,
287 Pa. 583. The plaintiff minor was a boy of eight. On
the outer lobby of defendant's theater, there was a ticketchopping machine weighing between 150 and 175 pounds.
A friend of the plaintiff, named Goldberg, was seated behind the ticket-chopper. It appeared that Goldberg, with
typical youthful ambition, was voluntarily operating this
chopper, with the hope that he might get free admission.
The defendant did not know that he was there, and did
not employ him. The plaintiff was talking to Goldberg
when a patron entered and handed a ticket to Goldberg,
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who turned it over to the plaintiff so that the latter might
drop the ticket into the machine, but on attempting to remove his hand, found that somehow it had become stuck.
In trying to wrench it free, he pulled the ticket-chopping
machine upon himself, causing a fracture to his leg. Suit
was brought against the owner of the theater, and the statement of claim alleged two items of negligence-first, that
the chopper was so located that it was possible for it to
topple and injure persons on the premises; second, that the
defendant allowed persons under fourteen years of age to
work the chopper.
The trial court entered a compulsory non-suit and subsequently refused to take it off. An appeal was taken to
the Superior Court, which affirmed the action of the lower
court. In a per curiam opinion, it was held that there was
no negligence in permitting the machine to be located as it
was, especially since there was no evidence that the machine*was of an unsafe character or in improper working
order. It was also remarked that the defendant could not
be held responsible for the acts of Goldberg, because no
agency whatever was proved, nor did the defendant have
any knowledge that Goldberg was operating the machine.
While these cases do not provide any exceptions to
the principles governing a master's vicarious responsibility
for the acts of his servants, they do present some novel
and a few facetious illustrations of the application of these
rules.
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF

In these theater cases, it is usually very difficult for the
plaintiff to prove all of the essential and attendant facts,
because the details are peculiarly within the knowledge of
the defendant. The premises are under his supervision and
control. He knows the type of equipment used, and he has
the opportunity to investigate and examine all the physical
objects involved in the accident. What is the plaintiff's
burden in such cases? Must he prove affirmatively every
item, as is normally incumbent upon a plaintiff? In answer-
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ing this important query, our Supreme Court, through
Justice Sadler, in Durning vs. Hyman, supra, thoroughly
considered all the elements involved and announced a
doctrine which is highly acceptable to plaintiffs in such
cases.
In that case, the plaintiff proved that his minor daughter passed up the aisle in the theater to a row of seats containing a number of vacant places. When she pulled one
down and sat on it, the left side gave way, causing her to
be thrown to the floor, whereby she sustained certain injuries. At the trial, she and a companion testified that the
seat "broke", causing the fall.
Upon the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony, the
defendant moved for a non-suit, on the ground that no negligence had been established, This motion was granted,
and subsequently the Court refused to take off the nonsuit. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which
reversed the judgment.
The Court admitted that ordinarily the burden of
proving that an injury resulted by reason of the defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care rests upon the
plaintiff, even where the claimant is a minor. It added,
however, that under certain sets of circumstances, an inference of negligence arises from the manner in which the
accident occurs. When, for example, the object which
causes the injury is under the management and control of
the defendant and the accident is such as does not occur
normally if those in control of the thing or premises use
proper care, the accident itself is reasonable evidence, in
the absence of a satisfactory explanation by the defendants,
that the latter failed to exercise due care. The Court concluded that the plaintiff in the case at bar should have been
afforded the judicial aid established by this doctrine.
Many theater cases from other jurisdictions were cited
to sustain the reversal. The following excerpt from the
opinion sets forth these foreign supporting authorities:
"It has been held in New York that, in the absence of proof by defendant showing a condition of
uncontradicted facts establishing a reasonable degree
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of care to keep the premises in proper condition, the
question is for the jury: Schnizer v. Phillips, 95 N. Y.
Supp. 478. Like rulings are to be found in other jurisdictions, where the theater patron has been injured by
slipping on a loose carpet (Sharpless v. Pantages, 178
Cal. 122, 172 Pac. 384); in stepping from a row of
seats to the aisle which was lower (Oakley v. Richards, 275 Mo. 266, 204 S. W. 505; Bennetts v. Silver
Bow Amusement Co., 65 Mont. 340, 211 Pac. 336):
into a depression in the aisle (Currier v. Boston Music
Hall Assn., 135 Mass. 414); by the unexplained fail of
a radiator in the lobby of the building (Carlson v.
Swenson, 197 Ill. App. 414); and by the breaking of a
seat installed for the use of the public: Fox v. Bronx
Amusement Co., 9 Ohio App. 426."
In the earlier case of Lowrey vs. Nixon Theater Company, 69 P. L. J. 179, the plaintiff introduced evidence to
show that she went to the defendant's theater to attend a
free lecture. Inside the doorway, she tripped over a mat
rug and fell, suffering injury to her arm and shoulder.
There was no evidence that the mat was out of place or
wrinkled, or that it was inherently dangerous. The Court
entered a non-suit and refused to take it off, holding that
these facts were not sufficient to warrant an inference of
negligence. This case is easily distinguishable from, and
quite consistent with, the Durning case. Here there was
no defective object or condition, such as a broken seat.
There was no evidence to show that the mat was not arranged properly. In the Lowrey case, moreover, the plaintiff had not paid any admission charge.
In the Durning case, the Court expressly stated that
"the facts here disclosed do not permit the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur", although it hardly can be
controverted that the principle applied there is practically
tantamount to res ipsa loquitur, In Kupperstein vs. Arch
Street Theatre, 11 D. & C. 275, it was held that where an
electric fan attached to the ceiling of a theater falls and
injures a patron, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
and the plaintiff, on the showing of these facts, is entitled
to have the case submitted to the jury. This case seems to
be an eminently fair one for the application of this doctrine.
GILBURT NURICK
Member of the Dauphin County Bar.

